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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Summary
Water rights have been subject to considerable change over the 
past several decades, and the pace of change is likely to increase. 
Water users will be forced to reduce their current diversions, 
often by substantial amounts, to protect endangered species, water 
quality, or other environmental amenities. Efforts to eliminate 
harmful groundwater mining will force cutbacks in current withdraw­
als. The few hybrid states with significant remaining riparian 
rights will at some point try once again to limit their scope. 
Pressures for greater public access to waterways will challenge the 
asserted right of many holders of surface interests to exclude the 
public. The one predictable aspect of water law's future is 
change— and publicly mandated change will inevitably invite takings 
challenges.
Changes over the last several decades have already brought a 
number of takings challenges. The results of these cases have been 
mixed, with water right holders winning only a few. Most of these 
cases, however, arose before the federal courts' new takings 
activism. Water right holders stand a far better chance today of 
invalidating governmental regulations or changes than just ten 
years ago. Water cases, however, raise a number of unique issues
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that make the future results of takings challenges difficult to 
predict with certainty.
A particularly interesting issue that has arisen in the water 
field is the constitutionality of "judicial takings." Many of the 
changes to water rights over the last decade have been the result 
of judicial decisions, and the same is likely to be true in the 
future. This central judicial role raises the question whether 
courts are subject to the same constitutional restrictions on the 
taking of private property as legislatures and administrative 
agencies. As I have argued elsewhere, courts should not be exempt 
from the constitutional restrictions, but how the restrictions 
should be applied to the courts remains a debated question.
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• Chapter 3 includes a discussion of takings challenges 
to water regulation
II. A CONCISE BACKGROUND TOUR OF CURRENT TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Pre-1982: The High Tide of Ad Hoc Balancing
In the 1970s, the United States Supreme Court rejected the 
view that there was or could be "any 'set formula' for determining 
when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused 
by public action be compensated by the government." Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The 
Court urged that takings cases must instead be handled as "ad hoc, 
factual inquiries" in which a number of different factors are 
weighed and balanced, including
• the "economic impact" of the governmental action on the
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property owner,
• the extent to which the action "has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations" of the owner, and
• the "character" of the action (e.g., does it result in a 
"physical invasion" of the property).
B. 1982-Today: A Search for More Crystalline Rules
The United States Supreme Court has not totally abandoned its 
ad hoc, balancing approach to determining when there has been a 
regulatory taking. But over the last ten years, the Court has 
tried to add some structure to its jurisprudence— in part by creat­
ing several per se categories of takings.
1. Physical occupations and invasions.
a. The doctrine
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982), the Court created its first per category and, in the 
process, stratified takings analysis according to the character of 
the governmental action under attack. According to Loretto, tak­
ings analysis varies dramatically depending on whether a govern­
mental regulation results in a "permanent physical occupation" of 
property, a "temporary physical invasion" of property, or neither:
• Regulations that result in "permanent physical occupations," 
according to the Court, are essentially the same as governmen­
tal condemnations and thus are per se takings.
• Where there is merely a "temporary physical invasion," there
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is a "governmental invasion of an unusually serious charac­
ter," presumably pointing toward a taking, but not necessarily 
being a taking; a bit of balancing still must occur.
• Finally, where there is no physical occupation or invasion, 
the Court indicated that we're back at the Central 
balancing test (and, some of the Court's language suggested, 
will seldom find a taking).
Since Loret, federal decisions have shed no additional light 
on the Supreme Court's tenuous distinction between "permanent 
physical occupations" and "temporary physical invasions." Federal 
courts, however, have continued to hold that virtually all 
governmental orders that deprive landowners of their right to 
exclude others from their property constitute per se takings. See, 
e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 
(1987); Hendler v. United Staes, 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(EPA order authorizing access to plaintiffs' property to install 
and maintain monitoring well constituted a per se taking).
b. Limits to the doctrine
Because of the per se rule against permanent physical 
occupations, attorneys for landowners have diligently tried to fit 
every possible regulatory action into the "physical occupation" 
category. In Yee v. City of Escondi, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992) , the 
Supreme Court indicated that it would be adopting a quite narrow 
definition of physical occupations. Plaintiffs argued that a city 
ordinance imposing below-market rental rates for mobile home pads,
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when combined with state laws that made it virtually impossible to 
evict mobile home tenants, effectively gave the tenants a fee 
interest in the land and thus constituted a physical taking. Two 
federal circuit courts of appeal had previously agreed with this 
argument. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed (although it left 
open the possibility that the plaintiffs could establish a 
regulatory taking through the Penn Central balancing test).
2. Other types of per se intrusions?
According to the Court in Loretto, physical occupations or 
invasions constitute particularly serious intrusions into property 
rights because a property owner's right to exclude others from her 
property is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of 
rights that are commonly characterized as property." 458 U.S. at 
433, quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 
(1979). This logic has raised the question whether there are other 
"essential sticks" in a property owner's bundle of rights that are 
also categorically protected against governmental regulation.
In Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716-18 (1987), the Court 
strongly suggested that the "right to pass on property" at one's 
death is also a core property interest and that any regulation 
abolishing that right is a per se taking. See also Inc. v. 
Seattle, 829 P.2d 765, 771 (Wash. 1992) (courts must determine 
whether a challenged regulation "destroys one or more of the 
fundamental attributes of property ownership— right to possess, to 
exclude others, and to dispose of property").
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3. Denial of all “economically viable use”
1992 brought a new per se test: regulations that deny a 
property owner all "economically viable use of his land" require 
compensation without any need for case-specific balancing. Lucas 
v . South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
Although the new "economically viable use" test seems quite narrow 
on the surface, the opinion that announced it raises numerous 
questions and is bound to generate considerable litigation in the 
lower courts. Two questions are likely to be particularly relevant 
to takings challenges to various water regulations:
(a) What is the relevant parcel of property in determining 
whether the owner has been deprived of "all economically beneficial 
use"? For example, if a property owner buys a piece of property 
composed of two adjacent lots and a regulation prevents her from 
using one of the lots, has she been deprived of all use of one lot 
or only partial use of the entire parcel? Would it make any 
difference if the property were one lot, subdividable into two? 
one lot that is not subdividable? The Supreme Court recognized in 
a footnote to its Lucas opinion that this is a difficult question, 
but concluded that it did not have to resolve the question since 
the Lucas facts did not raise it.
(b) How should courts determine whether the "proscribed use 
interests" were part of the landowner's "title to begin with"? 
Here the Court provided the most guidance, although the guidance 
leaves us with yet other questions. A landowner subject to a total
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deprivation is entitled to compensation unless the challenged 
regulation does "no more than duplicate the result that could have 
been achieved * * * under the state law of private [or public] 
nuisance * * * or otherwise." 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
In short, the state must show that any economic use to which 
the landowner wishes to put his property would be a common law 
nuisance (or otherwise banned under the common law) and thus not a 
property right to begin with. And Lucas leaves it quite clear that 
state courts cannot uphold regulations simply by asserting without 
precedential support that the regulations do nothing that nuisance 
law wouldn't have done:
We emphasize that to win its case South Carolina must do 
more than proffer * * * the conclusory assertion that 
[the uses Lucas desires] violate a common-law maxim such 
as sic utere tuo ut alienum non As we have said, 
a 'State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private 
property into public property without compensation * *
*." Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 
U.S. 155, 164 (1980). Instead, as it would be required 
to do if it sought to restrain Lucas in a common-law 
action for public nuisance, South Carolina must identify 
background principles of nuisance and property law that 
prohibit the uses he now intends in the circumstances in 
which the property is presently found.
Id. at 2901. The Court, moreover, indicated that courts should 
normally look to state nuisance law as it stood before the regula­
tion at issue (id.), although "changed circumstances or new know­
ledge may make what was previously permissible no longer so" (id.).
Despite this guidance, the Court again leaves us with many 
questions. Does the Court mean to freeze the state common law of 
property and nuisance (except to the extent that applying preexist­
ing legal rules to new knowledge perhaps leads to different
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results)? This is how Justice Stevens interpreted the majority 
opinion. Id. at 2921 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
If this is the correct interpretation of Lucas, does the Court 
intend to second guess state court determinations of common law in 
future takings cases? The Court has always reserved for itself the 
right in takings cases to reconsider a state court's determination 
of whether a property right existed. See Demorest v. City Bank 
Farmers Trust, 321 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1944).
Can a property owner challenge a judicial change in property 
or nuisance law as a "judicial taking" even when no legislative or 
administrative action is involved? This issue is discussed in 
Section V below. If the Court does not mean to freeze the common 
law, however, why should courts have more power than the legisla­
ture to change the law to meet evolving needs or views?
C. Can a Property Owner Challenge a Regulation on the Ground 
of Insufficient Governmental Justification?
The Supreme Court developments discussed so far all focus on 
the impact of a regulation on the property owner: does the regula­
tion strip the property owner of a core interest or eliminate all 
the "economically valuable" use of his property? The Court has 
also expressed an increasing interest in the purposes behind the 
governmental regulation. Reading between the lines, one comes away 
from recent decisions with the distinct impression that some 
members of the Court— Justice Scalia in particular— believe that 
local and state legislatures and administrative agencies are often 
using their "police power" as a screen for unprincipled redistrib­
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utive actions.
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), best 
embodies the Court's interest in regulatory purpose. Quoting 
language from prior opinions, the Court emphasized that regulations 
are takings if they do not "substantially advance legitimate state 
interests." Id. at 483. In response to Justice Brennan's sugges­
tion that this language simply embodies the minimum rationality 
test of due process and equal protection, moreover, the Court 
stressed that the takings test was purposefully higher:
[O]ur opinions do not establish that [takings] standards 
are the same as those applied to due process or equal 
protection claims. To the contrary, our verbal formula­
tions in the takings field have generally been quite 
different. We have required that the regulation "sub­
stantially advance" the "legitimate state interest" 
sought to be achieved, not that "the State ' ration­
ally have decided' that the measure adopted might achieve 
the State's objective." * * * [T]here is no reason to 
believe * * * that so long as the regulation of property 
is at issue the standards for takings challenges, due 
process challenges, and equal protection challenges are 
identical; any more than there is any reason to believe 
that so long as the regulation of speech is at issue the 
standards for due process challenges, equal protection 
challenges, and First Amendment challenges are identical.
Id. at 834-35 n.3 (citations omitted).
Lower federal and state courts, however, have shown consider­
able reticence about increasing their scrutiny of land use 
regulations. Most courts have chosen either to distinguish Nollan 
on the facts before them or to argue that Nollan really did not 
mean to impose a heightened scrutiny on land use regulations. See, 
e.g., Commercial Builders of Northern Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 
941 F. 2d 872, 874-76 (9th Cir. 1991) (Nolan does not require 
heightened scrutiny) ; Blue Jean Equities West v. City & County of
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San Francisco, 3 Cal. App. 4th 164, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114 (1992)
( Nollan applies only "to possessory rather than regulatory takings 
cases").
III. TAKINGS CLAIMS INVOLVING PRIVATELY HELD WATER RIGHTS
Although Lucas was generally strongly protective of property 
rights, dictum in the case suggests that the Court may be willing 
to differentiate among different types of property rights and 
accord some forms of property less protection than others. In 
particular, the Court noted that its takings jurisprudence had 
traditionally been guided by the understandings of our citizens 
regarding the content of, and the State's power over, the 'bundle 
of rights' that they acquire when they obtain title to property," 
and indicated that personal property might be entitled to less 
protection than land. 112 S. Ct. at 2879.
This section describes how the courts have historically dealt 
with takings challenges to the regulation of privately held water 
rights, and examines how the courts might deal with future 
challenges.
A. The Case Law
Numerous attempts to limit or regulate water rights have come 
under constitutional attack as "takings." Until quite recently, 
such attacks were no more successful than takings challenges to 
zoning and other regulations of real property— indeed, less 
successful. In recent years, water users have enjoyed a greater
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level of success, although the road is still steep.
1. State efforts to abolish or limit riparian rights.
Six states, including Washington, have tried to abolish 
unexercised riparian rights through legislation. In every state, 
riparians challenged the legislation as a taking of their rights.
a. Decisions upholding state legislation
In all but two states, the state courts have upheld the 
legislation. According to the Washington State Supreme Court in 
Department of Ecology v. Abbott, 103 Wash. 2d 686, 694 P.2d 1071, 
1077 (1985), it "is well established that riparian rights may be 
extinguished or limited by statute." See Power
Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 73 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1934),
aff'd, 295 U.S. 142 (1935); Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617 (D. 
Kan. 1956), aff'd, 352 U.S. 863 (1956); Williams v. City of
Wichita, 190 Kan. 317, 374 P.2d 578 (1962), cert, denied, 375 U.S. 
7 (1963); State ex rel. State v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546, 207 P.2d 440 
(1949); In re Hood River, 114 Or. 112, 227 P. 1065 (1924), appeal 
dismissed, 273 U.S. 647 (1926); Belle Fourche Irr. Dist. v. Smiley, 
84 S.D. 701, 176 N.W.2d 239 (1970); In re Water Rights of Guadalupe 
River Basin, 642 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. 1982).
b. California
In California, the court invalidated the legislation not on 
takings grounds but because a 1928 constitutional amendment,
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according to the court, expressly protected unused riparian rights. 
See Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore I.Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 
489, 45 P.2d 972 (1935) ; see also In re Waters of Long Valley Creek 
Stream System, 25 Cal. 3d 339, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350, 599 P.2d 656 
(1979) (distinguishing Tulare in a fashion that suggests the case 
is no longer viable law in California).
c. Oklahoma
Only Oklahoma, in a very recent decision, has held that such 
legislation constitutes a taking. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. 
v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 855 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1990). By a 
five to four vote, the Oklahoma Supreme Court invalidated 1963 
state legislation limiting future riparian water use to (1) water 
used for domestic purposes and (2) any pre-1963 beneficial uses 
that the riparian properly validated. The court's logic was 
straight forward: Riparian rights are private property and thus 
protected by the Oklahoma constitution from takings. The 1963 
water code amendments did not simply "restrict" unused riparian 
rights, but "took" them "for public use" by permitting appropria- 
tors to divert the water.
Franco-American represents an interesting example of how Lucas 
might be applied to the water field. The Oklahoma Supreme Court 
essentially took the riparian right and divided it into two parts: 
(1) any currently exercised portion of the right, and (2) the 
unused portion of the right which, under the common law, can always 
be exercised in the future. In the court's view, the unused por­
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tion of the right had a unique importance of its own: the "heart of 
the riparian right is the right to assert a use at any time." 
Having narrowed the relevant water right down to the unexercised 
right, the court could conclude that the state had totally stripped 
riparians of this right rather than merely "regulating" the right—  
and thus had taken riparians' property without compensation.
2. State and local groundwater regulation.
State courts have quite consistently upheld legislative or 
administrative actions limiting the amount of groundwater that can 
be extracted from an aquifer— even when the limit is inconsistent 
with prior common law groundwater rights. See, e.g., Peterson 
Department of Ecology, 92 Wash. 2d 306, 596 P.2d 285 (1979) ; Aikins 
v. Arizona Dept, of Water Resources, 154 Ariz. App. 437, 743 P.2d 
946 (1987); Town of Chino v. City of Prescott, 131 Ariz. 78, 638 
P.2d 1324 (1981), appeal dismissed, 457 U.S. 1101 (1982); Baeth v. 
Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1968); Kline v. State, 759 P.2d 210 
(Okla. 1988); Knight v. Grimes, 127 N.W.2d 708 (S.D. 1964).
An exception to the rule highlights the potential importance 
to takings claims of the purpose behind the challenged governmental 
action. In McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 
1991), the plaintiffs, who operated a commercial water business in 
which they pumped and sold groundwater, and the County of Imperial 
had long been involved in a dispute over plaintiffs' sale of water 
to farmers across the border in Mexico, The County had first tried 
to directly ban such sales, but the plaintiffs successfully chal­
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lenged the ban in court. After plaintiffs bought a new well in 
1977, the County passed an ordinance which, purportedly to avoid 
groundwater overdraft, required the plaintiffs to stop pumping 
water from the well by 1986; in 1984, moreover, the County declared 
the property a "floodway," effectively preventing plaintiffs from 
developing the property. When the County refused to lift its ban 
on post-1986 pumping except on onerous conditions that plaintiffs 
could not meet, plaintiffs sued.
The district court rejected plaintiffs' taking claim on the 
ground that the county regulations were designed to advance a 
legitimate state interest. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed 
and remanded for consideration of two issues. First, the Court of 
Appeals ordered the lower court to determine whether the public 
interest outweighed the severity of the private deprivation. Id. 
at 676. Second, and of perhaps greater longterm significance, the 
Court of Appeals ordered the lower court to consider whether the 
county acted out of an illegitimate purpose— in particular, "to 
retaliate against [the plaintiffs] and halt the sale of water to 
Mexico." Id. at 676-77, 679-80.
3. Other governmental regulations or actions.
a. Registration of water rights
State courts have rejected state legislation requiring water 
right holders to register their water rights (at the cost of 
otherwise forfeiting the rights). See, e.g., Department of Ecology 
v. Adsit, 103 Wash. 2d 698, 694 P.2d 1065, 1069-70 (1985); Matter
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of Yellowstone River, 253 Mont. 167, 832 P.2d 1210 (1992); see also 
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982) (upholding the Indiana 
Dormant Mineral Act which eliminated severed mineral interests that 
the owner did not use for 20 years unless the owner filed a 
statement of claim).
b. Retroactive application of forfeiture statutes
The Nevada Supreme Court has held that it is not unconstitu­
tional for a state to retroactively apply a forfeiture statute. 
Town of Eureka v. Office of State Engineer, 108 Nev. 163, 826 P.2d 
948, 950-52 (1992).
c. Requantification of water rights
The Montana Supreme Court has held that a state, without 
running afoul of the takings protections, can take water rights 
that are quantified only by diversion rate and requantify them by 
both rate and total annual volume. McDonald v. State, 220 Mont. 
519, 722 P.2d 598 (1986).
d. Use of aquifer storage capacity
The Nebraska Supreme Court has held that the government does 
not have to pay compensation for the use of aquifer storage space 
underlying private land. In re Application U-2, 226 Neb. 594, 413 
N.W.2d 290, 298-99 (1987).
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B. Are Water Rights Subject to as Much Constitutional 
Protection as Rights to Land?
1. Cases holding water rights to be protected property.
In most of the cases upholding water regulations, courts have 
relied on the conclusion that the regulations were "reasonable" 
restrictions on water rights or legitimate exercises of the state's 
"police power." Virtually every court has recognized that water 
rights are property and thus entitled to at least some degree of 
constitutional protection. See, e.g, Department of Ecology v. 
Adsit, 103 Wash. 2d 698, 694 P.2d 1065, 1069-70 (1985); Public
Service Comm'n v. FERC, 754 F.2d 1555, 1564 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 1681 (1986); Fallini v. , 725 F. Supp. 1113,
1123 (D. Nev. 1989), aff'd on other grounds, 963 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 
1992); Town of Eureka v. Office of State Engineer, 108 Nev. 163, 
826 P.2d 948, 951 (1992); Hale v. Colorado River Muni. Water Dist., 
818 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). Indeed, most courts have 
viewed water rights much like real property for takings purposes, 
and have used the same general standards and terminology in takings 
challenges to both types of rights.
2. Cases suggesting less protection for unused water rights.
Some courts and commentators, however, have suggested that 
water rights might be subject to less protection than real proper­
ty. A number of cases, for example, have suggested that unexer­
cised riparian or groundwater rights are entitled to virtually no 
constitutional protection. See, e.g., State v. Knapp, 167 Kan.
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546, 207 P.2d 440, 447 (1949); Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728, 
732 (N.D. 1968); In re Hood River, 114 Or. 112, 227 P. 1065, 1094 
(1924); Bell Fourche Irr. Dist. v. Smiley, 204 N.W.2d 105, 107
(S.D. 1973).
This suggestion is not totally unique to water law: a similar 
distinction is found in zoning cases where courts readily award 
compensation if a zoning ordinance forces an existing use to stop 
immediately, but seldom award compensation if the ordinance simply 
forecloses a future use. The presumable logic is that people have 
a far greater reliance expectation, and thus compensation claim, in 
rights that they are using.
3. Cases suggesting less protection for water rights 
generally.
Some courts have also suggested that there is something 
intrinsically different about water rights that entitle them to 
less protection than real property even when the water is actively 
being used. If correct, these opinions will be quite important in 
future cases which are far more likely to involve state actions 
requiring current water users to reduce their diversions or with­
drawals than to involve the limiting of unexercised rights.
a. Strong public interest in water
One major justification often given for providing less protec­
tion to water is that there is a greater public interest in water 
than in other property. Justice Holmes' opinion in Hudson County 
Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908) is typically
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quoted:
[F]ew public interests are more obvious, indisputable and 
independent of particular theory than the interest of the 
public of a State to maintain the rivers that are wholly 
within it substantially undiminished, except by such 
drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare 
may permit for the purpose of turning them to a more 
perfect use. This public interest is omnipresent wher­
ever there is a State, and grows more pressing as popula­
tion grows. * * * The private right to appropriate is 
subject not only to the rights of lower owners but to the 
initial limitation that it may not substantially diminish 
one of the great foundations of public welfare and 
health.
In this same vein, state courts in many western states have 
often pointed to the unique importance of water to the West as a 
justification for limiting water rights without paying compensa­
tion. See, e.g., Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617, 625 (D. Kan. 
1956), aff'd, 352 U.S. 863 (1956); Baeth supra, 157 
N.W.2d at 733; In re Hood River, supra, 227 P. at 1092-93.
Response: To the extent that no per se test for a taking is 
involved, such considerations may be relevant. See, e.g., Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictus , 480 U.S. 470, 492 (1987) 
(suggesting that courts must consider the benefit of a government 
action in deciding whether the action is a taking) .  But the 
special importance of water should not be emphasized too much, lest 
courts forget Justice Holmes' oft quoted warning that "a strong 
public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to 
warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitu­
tional way of paying for the change." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
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b. Usufructuary versus possessory rights
Perhaps the justification given most frequently by courts for 
according water rights weaker constitutional protection is that 
water users have only usufructuary rather than possessory rights to 
water. See, e.g., Town of Chino Valley City of Prescott, 131 
Ariz. 78, 638 P.2d 1324, 1328, appeal dismissed, 457 U.S. 1101
(1982); Pratt v. State Dept, of Natural Resources, 309 N.W.2d 767, 
772 (Minn. 1981).
Response: Other non-possessory property rights such as
easements and leases, however, are fully protected by the takings 
protection. The mere fact that water is a usufructuary right thus 
is an unconvincing distinction.
c. Public "ownership" of water rights
Courts wishing to distinguish water from real property also 
sometimes emphasize state constitutional or statutory provisions 
reciting that water is the property of the public. See, e.g., F. 
Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 230 Kan. 224, 630 P.2d 1164 (1981); 
Pratt v. State Dept, of Natural Resources, supra, 309 N.W.2d at 
771. The United States Supreme Court has lent some support to this 
argument both in its frequent emphasis on "investment-backed 
tations" and by holding that the takings protections do not apply 
where a property right is expressly conditioned on the right of the 
government to nullify the right. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. 
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 674 n.6 (1981).
Response: Nonetheless, there is something quite troubling
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about this argument standing by itself: can states exempt them­
selves from the Constitution's takings protections merely by 
declaring that they are the ultimate "owner" of a resource that, 
for all practical purposes, the states treat like a privately owned 
resource? For arguments that the Constitutional protections are 
not that easily evaded, see my article on Judicial Takings, 76 Va . 
L. Rev. at 1527-30. Despite various state statutory and constitu­
tional provisions stating that water resources ultimately belong to 
the state or the public, states have historically treated water 
rights like private property— creating expectations in the holders 
of the water rights that should be honored.
d. Extensive prior regulation
Less troubling as a general proposition is the argument that 
states have considerable room to regulate appropriative water 
rights without paying compensation because such rights are subject 
ab initio to a variety of broad restrictions. There is room for 
play, for example, in the traditional appropriation requirement 
that water be used only for a reasonable and beneficial use. If a 
state chooses to require current appropriators to reduce their 
diversions to increase instream flows, a state might argue that 
prior diversion levels were "unreasonable" and thus not protected 
property to begin with. Lucas' suggestion that personal property 
might not be entitled to as much protection as land, because 
personal property has been subject to a "traditionally high degree 
of [governmental] control," lends some support to this argument.
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See p. 11 supra; 112 S. Ct. at 2879; Broughton Lumber Co. v. United 
States, 30 Fed. Cl. 239 (1994) (denying compensation because of
doubts whether water right holder could use water for hydroelectric 
purposes).
Response: Lucas, however, also suggests that states cannot
escape the takings protections merely by stretching traditional 
doctrines to novel lengths. As discussed earlier, the Court held 
that a regulation is not unconstitutional if it merely duplicates 
common law restrictions. But the Court emphasized that a state 
could not justify a regulation merely by invoking vague or 
conclusory common law doctrines. The state must point to "existing 
rules or understandings" and cannot "by ipse dixit * * * transform 
private property into public property without compensation." In 
the water field, therefore, states should not be able to elude 
paying compensation by reading new or significantly expanded 
meaning into traditional common law doctrines.
C. Do the Same Takings "Principles11 Apply to Water Cases?
Accepting that water rights are entitled to some degree of 
takings protection, an additional question is whether current 
takings jurisprudence should be applied, or even can be applied, to 
the water context. Takings jurisprudence was developed to address 
land cases, not the quite different resource of water. Attempts to 
apply current takings jurisprudence to water cases, therefore, can 
raise difficult issues.
Assume that to protect an endangered species, the government
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orders a water user to cut her historic water use by half. Is this 
a physical taking or a regulatory taking? In a property context, 
if the government forbids you from building on half your land, the 
courts would treat the action as a regulatory taking. But water is 
different from land because your only right is to use the water. 
Thus the government order has deprived the water user of all her 
legal rights to half her water, which sounds very much like a 
physical taking.
If the court concludes that the government order is not a 
physical taking, does the order fall within any of the per se 
takings categories? Does the action, for example, deprive the 
water user of an "essential stick" in her bundle of rights? What 
is an "essential stick" might well differ between land and water. 
Alternatively, does the action deprive the owner of all economical­
ly viable use of her water? That, of course, depends on how you 
define the parcel of water at issue.
IV. TAKINGS CLAIMS INVOLVING PUBLIC DELIVERY OF WATER
Public delivery of water supplies has generated its own unique 
set of takings claims. In the past, most claims have involved 
property owners who were denied water by the local public water 
supplier and had no alternative source of water. Today, attempts 
to reform the federal reclamation program by increasing water rates 
and reducing water deliveries are provoking a separate wave of 
takings challenges.
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A. Nondelivery bv Public Water Suppliers
The California courts have frequently been confronted by the 
question whether property owners have any constitutionally 
protected right to receive water from a public water supplier. 
Largely in response to anti-growth sentiment, a number of Califor-
f
nia water suppliers have declared water moratoriums and denied 
applications for new or additional service connections. Property 
owners who have needed water in order to develop or use their land, 
not surprisingly, have often responded with challenges based on 
takings and other claims.
Until recently, courts uniformly rejected such claims. The 
typical basis was that, under state law, property owners do "not 
possess any absolute right to be afforded water service." Swanson 
v. Marin Muni. Water Dist., 56 Cal. App. 3d 512, 128 Cal. Rptr.
485, 491 (1976); see also Hollister Park Inv. Co. v. Goleta County 
Water Dist., 82 Cal. App. 3d 290, 147 Cal. Rptr. 91, 93 (1978).
In a recent opinion, however, the Ninth Circuit has given 
property owners a glimmer of hope that they might be able to raise 
a successful constitutional claim. In Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 
1150 (9th Cir. 1990) , the Court of Appeals— in a prequel to Lucas—  
held that a property owner can establish a taking if she can show 
that a moratorium prevents "all practical" or "economically viable" 
use of her land (defined not to include just looking at or walking 
on the land) . The court also suggested that, if a district has 
been wasting water and has sufficient water to permit additional 
hookups, a moratorium might be arbitrary and thus a violation of
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due process or equal protection.
B. Changes in Federal Reclamation Contracts
Beginning with the 1982 Reclamation Reform Act, Congress has 
set out to increase water rates and restrict deliveries to at least 
some water users. In many cases, Congress' changes have clashed 
with what water recipients claim to have been their contractual 
rights with the federal government. If the dispute involved 
alleged state changes to a state contractual obligation, water 
recipients could challenge the action under the Contract Clause of 
the federal Constitution, but in one of the peculiarities of the 
federal Constitution, the Contract Clause does not apply to the 
federal government. Water recipients, therefore, have been forced 
to argue that they have a property interest in their federal 
reclamation contracts and that the government's reform efforts thus 
violate the takings protections.
Federal courts have agreed that water recipients have a 
property interest in their contracts with the federal government, 
and that federal abrogation of contractual obligations can violate 
the takings protections. Beyond that, however, the courts have 
held that the federal government must be given substantial leeway 
in revisiting reclamation contracts. According to the courts, 
three principles make it very unlikely that reclamation reforms 
will constitute takings:
First, "sovereign power, even when unexercised, is an 
enduring presence that governs all contracts subject to 
the sovereign's jurisdiction, and will remain intact 
unless surrendered in unmistakable terms." Thus,
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"contractual arrangements, including those to which a 
sovereign itself is a party, 'remain subject to subse­
quent legislation' by the sovereign." Second, governmen­
tal contracts "should be construed, if possible, to avoid 
foreclosing exercise of sovereign authority." Third, 
governmental contracts should be interpreted against the 
backdrop of the legislative scheme that authorized them 
* * *.
Peterson v. Dept. of Interior, 899 F.2d 799 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 555 & 567 (1990) , quoting Bowen Public
Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986).
Given this wide latitude, federal courts to date have upheld 
Congress' various reform measures. In Peterson, the Ninth Circuit 
upheld the "hammer provisions" of the 1982 Reclamation Reform Act. 
More recently, in Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, the Circuit 
Court held that the federal government could impose a higher water 
rate in a renewal contract in order to recoup operation and 
maintenance costs that it had not recovered under an initial 40- 
year contract.
In neither of these cases, however, was the government 
violating a clear contractual obligation. Where the government 
tries to do so (e.g., perhaps by reducing promised water deliver­
ies) , the courts will be confronted by a stronger takings claim.
V. JUDICIAL TAKINGS
As noted in the Introduction, judicial changes to water rights 
raise their own unique set of takings issues.
A. Some Examples
To illustrate the question of judicial takings, consider a few
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examples.
1. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robin,54 Haw. 174, 504 P.2d 1330 (1973).
McBryde begot the longest and best known of the recent judic­
ial takings challenges. In McBryde, the Hawaiian Supreme Court 
appeared to radically change its state water law. Prior to 
McBryde, Hawaiian judicial decisions suggested that water rights 
were both severable and transferable; indeed, agricultural inter­
ests spent large sums buying water rights and moving the water to 
their fields. All of this changed with McBryde which held that 
water rights could not be sold nor water transported out of its 
watershed.
Private water users petitioned for rehearing, arguing that 
McBryde was an unconstitutional judicial taking. The Hawaiian 
Supreme Court denied the petition without opinion; two judges 
dissented, agreeing that the court could not impose its vision of 
a "better" water rights system on current water users without 
compensating users for their loss. 55 Haw. 260, 517 P.2d 26 
(1973).
The private water users then took their challenge to federal 
court, where both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that McBryde violated the takings protections. 
Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Haw. 1977), aff'd, 753 
F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985). The U. S. Supreme Court, however, 
vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded for consideration 
of whether the takings issue was ripe for review. 477 U.S. 902
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(1986). On remand, the Ninth Circuit ordered the complaints 
dismissed as premature because the state court had not yet issued 
a final order that limited or "interfered in any way with the 
parties' use or diversions" of their water. 887 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 
1989).
2. Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 131 Ariz. 78,
638 P. 2d 1324 (1981).
In Chino Valley, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected a takings 
challenge by groundwater users to the Arizona Groundwater Manage­
ment Act of 1980, partly on the basis that groundwater users did 
not own groundwater until they pumped it up for use and that users 
were thus not deprived of any property.
In Cherry v. Steiner, 716 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'g 543 
F. Supp. 1270 (D. Ariz. 1982), groundwater users challenged 
Valley as itself an unconstitutional taking, arguing that the 
decision effectively reversed older decisions holding that 
groundwater users did own the resource before extraction. The 
federal courts rejected the challenge on the ground that the 
Arizona Supreme Court had not changed the law; the language from 
the older decisions was discarded as mere dictum. In the process, 
however, the Ninth Circuit expressly recognized that a judicial 
change in water law could violate the takings protections.
3. National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 
419, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709 (1983).
Although the California Supreme Court in its Mono Lake decis­
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ion unanimously held that the public trust doctrine applied to and 
limited appropriations affecting navigable waterways, many 
California water lawyers and water users believed that the decision 
was a sharp and unjustifiable change in the law. In its petition 
for certiorari, the City of Los Angeles tried to emphasize the 
extent of the change and argued that the Mono Lake decision was an 
unconstitutional judicial taking. The Supreme Court denied the 
petition without comment. 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
4. Bott v. Michigan Dept, of Natural 415 Mich.
45, 327 N.W.2d 838 (1982).
Various interests urged the Michigan Supreme Court in Bott to 
expand the public's right to use Michigan waterways by rejecting 
the state's traditional "log-flotation" test in favor of a "recre­
ational-boating" test. The court refused, largely because such a 
change would deprive many riparians of "a property right without 
compensation." The court did not expressly hold that a change in 
the test would constitute a judicial taking, resting its refusal to 
change the law simply on the "unfairness of eliminating a property 
right without compensation."
Where other state courts have expanded the public's right to 
use waterways, riparians have sometimes unsuccessfully sought 
certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court on the ground that the 
expansion was a judicial taking. See, e.g., State v. McIlroy, 268 
Ark. 227, 595 S.W.2d 659, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980).
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B. Arguments For and Against Subjecting Judicial Decisions 
to the Takings Protections
1. Arguments for restricting judicial takings.
Strong arguments can be made in favor of subjecting judicial 
decisions to the federal takings protections. The language of the 
Fifth Amendment does not distinguish among the various branches of 
government. And the Fourteenth Amendment, which extends the 
takings protections to the states, is applied to judicial decisions 
in numerous other contexts. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 
U.S. 1, 16-18 (1948) (racial discrimination); Cantwell v. Connecti­
cut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (freedom of speech). The adverse
consequences to the property owner of a change in her rights, 
moreover, is exactly the same whether the change is made by the 
legislature, an administrative agency, or a court.
The arguments in favor of subjecting judicial decisions to the 
same constitutional restrictions as legislative and executive 
regulations are laid out at greater length in my article on 
Judicial Takings, 76 Va . L. Rev. 1449 (1990) .
2. Arguments against restricting judicial takings.
At least three policy arguments can be made against subjecting 
judicial decisions to the takings protections, although none is 
ultimately convincing.
a. "Courts are more trustworthy.”
The first argument looks at the possible reasons why the 
Constitution requires legislatures to pay compensation and asks
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whether the reasons apply equally to the courts. A number of 
judges and academics believe that we require legislatures to pay 
compensation because of imperfections in the legislative process: 
legislatures (1) reshuffle property rights often in response to 
naked majoritarian pressure (rather than for the "common good"), 
(2) frequently discriminate among property owners in condemning and 
regulating property, and (3) will treat property as "free" if they 
don't have to pay for it. The takings protections help remedy some 
of these flaws and compensate property holders who are victims of 
the other flaws. Many of these same judges and academics believe 
that courts are not subject to the same flaws as legislatures are 
and that compensation is therefore unnecessary when courts reshuf­
fle property rights.
Responses: More traditional arguments for the takings protec­
tions, however, do not depend on the existence of political or 
governmental imperfections. All that matters is that the govern­
ment has involuntarily expropriated a person's property or, by 
taking property without compensation, forced the owner to bear an 
unjustifiably large portion of societal costs. As I have argued 
elsewhere, moreover, state courts suffer from many of the same 
political imperfections as legislatures (albeit to a lesser degree 
in some cases). 76 Va . L. Rev. at 1482-98.
b. "Courts need to change the law."
Some have also objected that, if the takings protections are 
applied to judicial decisions, courts will not be able to change
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property law in response to evolving societal needs. Legislatures 
have a choice under the takings protections: they can take property 
and compensate, or not take the property. Because courts do not 
have treasuries of their own, however, most judges and lawyers have 
assumed that courts would not have a similar option. If a judicial 
change would take property, the courts could not make the change.
Responses: To begin, the takings protections apply only to a
narrow set of actions; most changes in property law would not be 
considered "takings." As discussed later in this outline, more­
over, state courts might well be able to find a way to provide 
compensation if they wished to make a change that would be consid­
ered a taking. Even if they could not, the legislature would still 
be free to institute the change. Administrative agencies also 
don't have their own treasury. And although legislatures theoreti­
cally can pay compensation, they often do not have the wherewithal 
to pursue a change if ordered to compensate injured property 
holders. (For a more extensive treatment of these issues, see my 
article at 76 Va . L. Rev. 1499-1509.)
c. Concerns over federalism.
Some judges and lawyers have also argued that the development 
of property law is a matter for the states, and that federal courts 
should not interfere with this local function by applying the 
takings protections to state property decisions.
Responses: Federalism arguments, however, apply equally to
all the branches of state government. Yet the courts have never
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held state legislatures and administrative bodies to a lower stan­
dard under the takings protections than they have held the federal 
government. See 76 Va. L. Rev. at 1509-11.
C. Case Lav
1. Supreme Court precedent.
The Supreme Court's view of judicial takings has fluctuated 
widely over time and never been entirely clear.
a. Do the takings protections apply?
In the first case to hold that states were subject to the 
federal takings protections, the Court also held that the takings 
protections applied to the courts. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 
R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233-35 (1897). But the
issue in the case was only whether a state court violated the 
takings protections by awarding one dollar for a legislative taking 
of property worth far more; the Court did not address the question 
whether a change in judicial law could constitute a taking.
In Muhlker v. New York & Harlem Railroad, 197 U.S. 544, 570-71 
(1905) , however, a 4-justice plurality held that the New York Court 
of Appeal had unconstitutionally taken someone's property by 
abandoning prior precedents.
In the 1930s, the Court seemed to reject this position and, 
although not directly addressing a judicial takings claim, held 
that courts could "ordinarily overrule their own decisions without 
offending constitutional guaranties." See Great Northern Ry. v.
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Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364-65 (1932); Brinke-
hoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680-81
(1930).
Justice Potter Stewart revived the idea of judicial takings in 
Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967), where he argued in a
concurring opinion that the fourteenth amendment forbids a state 
from taking property without compensation "no less through its 
courts than through its legislature." According to Stewart, a 
state decision does not contravene the Constitution if the decision 
"arguably conforms to reasonable expectations." But a decision is 
unconstitutional "to the extent that it constitutes a sudden change 
in state law, unpredictable in terms of the relevant precedents."
The Court as a whole has not addressed the judicial takings 
issue in the last several decades, although the Court quoted 
Stewart's concurrence with apparent agreement in Bonelli Cattle Co. 
v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 331 (1973). (Bonelli, however, was
itself overruled on other grounds in Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & 
Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977).)
b. When is a judicial decision a "taking"?
Assuming courts are subject to the takings protections, the 
appropriate test for determining whether there has been a judicial 
taking is unclear. A judicial decision presumably would not 
constitute a taking if an identical legislative or administrative 
action would not be a taking. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion 
in Hughes, however, suggests that courts should have somewhat
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greater constitutional leeway to change property rights than 
legislatures and administrative agencies are given: only "sudden” 
and "unpredictable" shifts in the law would be unconstitutional. 
Related Supreme Court opinions similarly suggest that state court 
decisions are valid if there is "fair support" or a "fair and 
substantial basis" for the decisions. See, e.g., Demorest v. City
Bank Farmers Trust, 321 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1944).
2. Lower court precedent.
a. Lower federal court precedent
Since Stewart's concurring opinion in Hughes, two federal 
courts have held state decisions to be unconstitutional takings. 
See Robinson v. Ariyosh, supra; Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 
F. Supp. 473 (D. Haw. 1978) (involving a change in the dividing
line between public and private beach).
Several other courts have recognized that a judicial decision 
might violate the takings protections, but have either held there 
was no taking on the facts presented or declined to hear the 
dispute on jurisdictional grounds. See, e.g., Cherry v. Steiner, 
716 F.2d 687, 692 (9th Cir. 1983) (no change in the law); Reynolds 
v. Georgia, 640 F.2d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1981) (no jurisdiction); 
Hay v. Bruno, 344 F. Supp. 286, 289 (D. Or. 1972) (no unpredictable 
change).
b. State court precedent
A number of state courts have also declined to overrule prior
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precedents on the ground that to do so might be unconstitutional. 
See, e.g., Dolphin Lane Assocs . v. Town of Southampton, 72 Misc. 2d 
868, 339 N.Y.S.2d 966, 975 (1971); State Corvallis Sand & Gravel 
Co., 283 Or. 147, 582 P.2d 1352, 1363 (1977).
Several state courts have also held that judicial changes to 
property rights can violate the takings clause, but concluded that 
their holdings did not constitute changes in the established 
property regime. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Berk, 26 Cal. 
3d 201, 212-15, 161 Cal. Rptr. 742, 749-51, 605 P.2d 381, 388-90 
(1980); Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., 86 111. 2d 1, 36-37, 
426 N.E.2d 824, 841 (1981).
D. Practical and Jurisdictional Issues
Although there are strong arguments, and some precedent, in 
favor of applying the takings protections to judicial decisions, 
both practical and jurisdictional problems are likely to limit the 
degree to which federal courts actively police judicial changes in 
state property or water law. The most valuable use of the judicial 
takings doctrine may be in influencing the actions of state courts.
1. United States Supreme Court Review.
Where a state court abandons its prior precedents and narrows 
or eliminates the property or water right of a party before it, the 
party can petition the United States Supreme Court for certiorari. 
The Court, however, has shown no interest in granting petitions 
that raise judicial takings claims. The Court's disinterest is
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unlikely to change for several reasons.
a. Worries about becoming enmeshed in state law
First, most state courts generally distinguish (or ignore) 
prior precedents in changing property or water rights; far from 
expressly abandoning the prior precedents, state courts will 
generally claim that the law has not changed. To hold that the 
state court has "taken" property, the Supreme Court would therefore 
need to immerse itself in the local law and conclude that the state 
court misinterpreted its own prior cases. For obvious reasons, the 
Supreme Court would prefer not to invest time becoming expert on 
local issues nor to cast aspersions on local courts.
b. Desire to maintain own flexibility
Second, the Court is almost certainly wary of the potential 
consequences of a judicial takings doctrine for its own flexibil­
ity. The Court itself has changed property and water rights in the 
past. Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel, 429 U.S. 363 (1977), for 
example, explicitly overruled Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 
U.S. 313 (1973) and thus reallocated to the State of Oregon
property that under Bonelli would have belonged to a private party. 
The Court will want to continue to keep its options open in the 
future.
c. Worries about the potential flood of petitions
Finally, the Court may be concerned about an increase in
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certiorari petitions if it were to reverse a state court decision 
as a judicial taking. Anyone who loses a property case in state 
court would then be tempted to argue that the court "changed" the 
law (i.e., ignored the litigant's arguments based on prior case law 
and precedents) and thus violated the takings protections. Given 
the indeterminacy in many areas of property law, most of these 
claims will be at least superficially plausible and difficult to 
reject out of hand.
2. Lower Federal Court Review.
a. Direct review of state court decisions
Unable to obtain Supreme Court review, a property owner or 
water right holder who has been injured by a state decision might 
try filing a lawsuit in federal district court challenging the 
constitutionality of the decision. Such a lawsuit, however, is 
likely to run into serious jurisdictional problems.
i. Ripeness and prematurity
As the water users in Robinson discovered, judicial takings 
challenges can run into prematurity problems. As noted at pages 
27-28, the Ninth Circuit on remand in Robinson held that the water 
users could not prosecute their judicial takings claim because the 
Hawaiian courts had not issued a final order that precluded the 
users from continuing to use their water rights as before. Robin­
son v. Ariyoshi, 887 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1989). Unless there is a 
court order expressly limiting use of one's property or water
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rights, therefore, any challenge to a state decision is likely to 
be dismissed as premature.
ii. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
A far more serious jurisdictional obstacle is presented by the 
R o o k e r - F e l d m a n  doctrine. In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 
413 (1923), plaintiffs who lost in state court brought a separate 
action in federal district court arguing that the state decision 
had changed the law in violation of the due process clause. The 
Supreme Court held that district courts do not have jurisdiction to 
review alleged constitutional flaws in state decisions because 
appellate jurisdiction over state decisions lies exclusively in the 
Supreme Court. In District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. 
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), the Supreme Court reaffirmed Rooker 
and observed that district courts cannot entertain "horizontal" 
challenges to state court decisions even on constitutional claims 
that were not raised in the state court.
Although the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would seem to bar 
district court review of judicial takings claims, the Ninth Circuit 
has narrowly interpreted the doctrine. In Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 
supra, the Ninth Circuit held that Rooker-Feldman does not apply 
where a property holder raises a judicial takings claim in a 
petition for rehearing of the offending state decision and the 
state court then fails to consider and decide the issue. 753 F.2d 
at 1471-73. The Ninth Circuit would presumably also hold that the 
doctrine does not apply in any situation where the property holder
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is not given an effective opportunity to raise a judicial takings 
claim in the state court.
The Fifth Circuit, by contrast, has expressly rejected the 
Ninth Circuit view and applies Rooker-Feldman broadly to bar all 
collateral attacks on alleged judicial takings. See, e.g., 
Reynolds v. Georgia, 640 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1981).
b. Incidental review of state court decisions.
A property holder who was not party to the offending state 
decision but who is affected by the decision may be able to obtain 
federal review if non-judicial state action is also involved. 
Where a property holder challenges legislative or administrative 
action as a taking and a defense is that the plaintiff did not have 
any property right to take, federal courts are free to decide the 
property question for themselves even though a state court has held 
that the claimed property right did not exist. See, e.g., Demorest 
v. City Bank Farmers Trust, 321 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1944).
As noted at page 28, for example, groundwater users were able 
to raise a federal challenge to the Arizona supreme court's decis­
ion in Chino Valley even though the state court had already consid­
ered and rejected the claim that its decision violated the takings 
protections. The groundwater users were able to bring the federal 
action because they were not technically challenging the Arizona 
Groundwater Management Act of 1980 and were not parties to the 
Chino Valley action.
40
3. Relevance to state court proceedings.
Because of the problems with federal review, judicial takings 
arguments might be most effectively used in urging state courts not 
to change the law to begin with. As previously noted, a number of 
courts have declined to modify their states' property or water law 
because of the argument that the modification would violate the 
takings protections.
In this regard, return for a moment to an earlier question: 
given that state courts don't have their own treasury, is there any 
way that they can make a change that would be a taking? Or must 
they leave any change to the legislature?
A reasonable argument can be made that courts have the power 
to change the law and order the state to compensate property 
holders for the change— although courts, for obvious reasons, are 
unlikely to exercise the power. Alternatively, a court could 
change the law contingent on the legislature authorizing compensa­
tion within a set period of time; if the legislature does not 
authorize compensation, the decision would not take effect. A 
court, for example, might order a water user to reduce its diver­
sions in light of the public trust, but only if the state agrees to 
pay compensation to the user.
This latter approach is not as far fetched as it might seem at 
first glance. California courts, for example, have generally held 
that the state must pay compensation if, in asserting the public 
trust, it appropriates or destroys improvements built by a private 
owner on trust lands. See, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.
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3d 240, 249, 625 P.2d 256, 261, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713, 719 (1981).
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the next decade, water law is likely to become a 
significant battlefield in the war over "takings." Unfortunately, 
water cases are also likely to add new complexities and puzzles to 
a jurisprudence which is already murky with uncertainty. This does 
not mean that courts should avoid tackling the issues. The 
constitutional protections against takings remain important for 
many reasons and call out for enforcement. The cases that confront 
the courts, however, will seldom be easy.
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